Overview
Introduction The incompetence of court processes, although technical, could result in multi-billion-naira liabilities for companies. The ability of a law firm to sign or frank court processes is one of those grounds of incompetence and is as significant as other germane legal complications that could sink the cases of corporate bodies. Hence, the developing position of the court and law on this subject is a concern for lawyers and in-house lawyers who seek to protect the interests of their respective clients and companies from technicality-enabled liabilities. The jurisprudence surrounding the status of a law firm under Section 2(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act has long been a subject of controversy.
Courts have repeatedly been invited to interpret the scope of this provision and to clarify whether a law firm can validly frank court processes in place of a named legal practitioner. The Supreme Court's decision in Olowe v. Aluko revisited the competence of processes signed by law firms and controversially appeared to depart from its earlier position in Okafor v. Nweke, where the Court unequivocally held that processes signed in the name of a law firm are incompetent and defective. The consequences of such incompetence are most severe where a writ of summons or other originating process bears only the name of a law firm. Following Okafor v. Nweke and subsequent decisions affirming it, legal practitioners have consistently raised objections on this ground, urging courts to strike out suits or applications.
This article examines the decision in Olowe v. Aluko, specifically whether it constitutes an exception to the earlier decision in Okafor v. Nweke, the practical implications of the Supreme Court's decision for clients, law firms, legal departments, and the need for administrative caution and internal compliance systems. Ensuring corporate risk management and eliminating negligence exposure.
